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In this paper, I explore the notion of sensorimotor event as the building block of sensorimo-
tor cognition. A sensorimotor event is presented here as a neurally controlled event that
recruits those processes and elements that are necessary to address the demands of the
situation in which the individual is involved. The notion of sensorimotor event is intended
to subsume the dynamic, embodied, and embedded nature of sensorimotor cognition, in
agreement with the satisﬁcing and bricoleur approach to sensorimotor cognition presented
elsewhere (Vilarroya, 2012). In particular, the notion of sensorimotor event encompasses
those relevant neural processes, but also those bodily and environmental elements,
that are necessary to deal with the situation in which the individual is involved. This
continuum of neural processes as well as bodily and environmental elements can be
characterized, and this characterization is considered the basis for the identiﬁcation of the
particular sensorimotor event. Among other consequences, the notion of sensorimotor
event suggests a different approach to the classical account of sensory-input mapping
onto a motor output. Instead of characterizing how a neural system responds to an external
input, the idea defended here is to characterize how system-in-an-environment responds
to its antecedent situation.
Keywords: evolutionary psychology, extended cognition, situated cognition, active externalism, sensorimotor
event, sensorimotor cognition
In a previous paper (Vilarroya, 2012), I introduced a set of neural
processing principles and evolutionary constraints that should be
taken into account in the characterization of sensorimotor cogni-
tion. I also reviewed evidence supporting the choice of the set of
principles, and I assessed how such principles apply in two cases,
object perception-action and peripersonal space. The aim was to
emphasize the importance of focusing sensorimotor models on
how evolution shapes functional paths to adaptations, as well as
to adopt ﬁtness maximization analyses of cognitive functions. The
analysis yielded the view that neural systems should not be seen
as a seat of optimal processes and circuits addressing particular
problems in sensorimotor cognition, but as a set of satisﬁcing and
tinkered components, mostly not addressing the problems that
are supposed to solve, but solving them as secondary effects of the
engaged processes.
The aim of this paper is to provide an outline of the building
block of sensorimotor cognition, which can be used to charac-
terize this type of satisﬁcing and bricoleur cognitive systems. The
basic idea is that sensorimotor cognition must be understood as a
coupling between the neural system and the external environment
that deals with the speciﬁc situation the individual is experienc-
ing. Hence, the logical outcome of such an approach is to establish
the ongoing event, the particular situation in which an individual
is involved, as the point of departure for the characterization of
sensorimotor cognition.
The paper is organized as follows. I will ﬁrst describe the neu-
ral processing principles that were presented elsewhere (Vilarroya,
2012). I will then introduce the notion of sensorimotor event
as the way to adopt such neural principles in the characteriza-
tion of sensorimotor cognition. The notions of affordance of the
event and that of event’s functionality will be then described. In
the next section I will focus on the embodied and embedded
nature of sensorimotor events, and subsequently I develop how
events are integrated in sequences and co-occur with other events.
I will conclude with a discussion focused on how adopting the
notion of sensorimotor event affects the classical framework of
sensory-input mapping into a motor output.
NEURAL PROCESSING PRINCIPLES
In a previous paper (Vilarroya, 2012) I showed that cognitive
adaptations were obtained through a functional organization of
neural systems that complies with a number of neural processing
principles. The principles are the following:
IN-FOCUS
The neural system selectively and contextually processes part of
the all the available signals in order to manage the solicitation of
the situation in which it is involved.
AD HOC
Many studies are increasingly showing that the neural system is a
much lessmodular than it hadbeenpreviously thought (Anderson,
2010). In this sense, the position I defend is to assume a contingent
level of functional specialization, where nervous systems can be
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seen to have specialized circuits, because some of its elements
(e.g., sensors) are contingently constrained to process certain data
(e.g., electromagnetic waves) and because some circuits undertake
some types of speciﬁc tasks (e.g., visual), devoting some ﬁxed
resources to them.
TRANSVERSAL
The interaction among different sensorimotor modalities is per-
vasive for all neural processes.
HETERARCHICAL
The nervous system processes signals at different stages, though
these stages do not imply strict boundaries, nor sequential pro-
cessing; namely, there are no strict boundaries between sensory,
perceptual, and motor stages, nor is there a strict bottom-up or
top-down hierarchy.
MODULATED
The neural system is endowed with speciﬁc mechanisms that
regulate the processing of neural signals as a function of the
endogenous relevance of such data. Such modulatory func-
tions have the property of biasing, controlling, and modifying
neural processing endogenously, through reward/punishment,
inhibition/activation, and other similar constraints.
OPEN
An open system is a system that is necessarily in interaction with
an environment. The brain has also been considered as an open
system in which information is exchanged with the environment.
However, as I understand it, the open principle also applies to the
functional characterization of the system. Hence, the idea is that
the brain is an open system whose sensorimotor capabilities must
be characterized taking into account the brain and the environ-
ment. There is an interchange of information between the brain
and the environment, but also, functionally, it is necessary to char-
acterize the neural system and the environment as a functional
continuity. The environment has an active role in the cognitive
activity of the system, and it is necessary to characterize and model
the functionality of the system.
SENSORIMOTOR EVENT
Elsewhere, I have (Vilarroya, 2012) assessed the suitability of this
set of principles in two cases: object perception, and peripersonal
space. As mentioned before, the picture we get from applying such
a set of principles suggests that sensorimotor cognition must be
understood as a coupling between the neural system and the exter-
nal environment, and such a coupling dynamically addresses the
ongoing situation. This should come as no surprise. In a dynamic
context, the minimal function of the neural system is to help the
individual to get from the present moment into the following one
by satisfying the system’s needs, nothing more than this. What
happens in the neural system within the framework of a concrete
situation is what we need to understand about the brain to charac-
terize it. We could in fact understand the function of the nervous
system to characterize the present situation, according to the needs
of the system (what happens now that it is relevant to me), and
act upon it selecting the most appropriate action, according to the
needs of the system (how do I get what I want?).
Accordingly, the logical outcome of the approach defended here
is to establish the ongoing event, the particular situation in which
an individual is involved in, as the point of departure for the char-
acterization of sensorimotor cognition. In the rest of this paper I
will try to outline the main features of the notion of sensorimotor
event. Let me ﬁrst provide a working deﬁnition of sensorimotor
event:
SENSORIMOTOR EVENT
A sensorimotor event is a neurally controlled event during which
its affordances are addressed by the engagement of a number of
functionalities.
By event I understand a particular temporally bounded situa-
tion, and by neurally controlled I assume that the event’s duration,
processing and register is managed by the neural system. These are
two uncontroversial notions, and thus I will not address them in
detail. Instead, I will now explore the notions of affordances and
functionalities, which require further explanation.
EVENT AFFORDANCES
If we see a glass of water on a table, and we realize that we are
thirsty, then the open ended number of possible sensorimotor
actions available to the individual will be constrained to a number
of sensorimotor responses that are adapted to the situation. The
fact is that every sensorimotor event is preceded by another event
that primes an adaptive response. Such a response is constrained
by neurobiological predispositions (selected for by evolution) and
previous experiences of the individual. The set of constrained
responses that are primed by the antecedent event will be deﬁned
here as the affordances of the event.
I borrow this notion of affordance from the domain of ecologi-
cal psychology (Gibson,1986). Originally, the notionof affordance
referred to a property of an object or of the environment that offers
a biological organism the possibility of an action; an affordance
would be a precondition for amotor activity (Greeno, 1994). Typi-
cal affordances include objects that can bemanipulated in a certain
way, such as a mug’s handle affords holding it, or substances afford
being eaten or drunk. Affordances, once detected, have adaptive
value for the organism that detects them.
The properties of the affordances were traditionally attributed
strictly to the object or the environment. Now it is recognized that
the affordance cannot be simply in the stimulus or in the envi-
ronment. Affordances are now conceived as relations between the
features of a situation and the abilities of an individual (Chemero,
2003). The notion of affordance has been in fact revisited and
re-deﬁned in a sense that better ﬁts my proposal here. An affor-
dance is deﬁned now as a relational property that emerges from
matching the perceived physical features of an object (e.g., size,
shape, texture, density) and the agent’s abilities and requirements.
More speciﬁcally, Ellis and Tucker (2000) introduced the notion of
“microaffordance” to indicate the activation of sensorimotor com-
ponents (reaching and grasping processes, such as establishing the
size and distance from an object) suitable for interacting with
speciﬁc objects and adapted to the individual needs. A particular
microaffordance, such as the judgment of distance with respect to
a given object, would vary according to the action intentions of
the individual (Witt et al., 2004).
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In my opinion, the notion of affordance in which the environ-
ment “primes some constrained response by the organism” can be
likened to the way an antecedent event “primes” a response from
the ensuing event. Basically, I understand an event’s affordance as
the constrained responses that a previous event primes the ensuing
event.
The event’s affordances are the critical element of an event
because the neural system will prioritize the management of the
affordances at issue; affordances guide, deﬁne, bias the activity
of the system. Furthermore, affordances determine the temporal
limits of the event: an event ends when the affordances are effec-
tively addressed, or abandoned due to inability to deal with them
(a mug being too far away) or to particular contingencies of the
situation (a phone rings while trying to grasp a mug).
EVENT’S FUNCTIONALITIES
Considerwhat happenswhenweperform thepreviously simple act
of reaching out and picking up a glass of water. After identifying
the glass among all the other possible objects on the table, we
begin to reach out with our trunk, body, and hand toward the
glass, choosing a trajectory that avoids the lamp which is in the
middle of the path toward the glass. At the same time, our ﬁngers
begin to conform to the shape and texture of the glass well before
we make contact with it. As our ﬁngers turn around the glass,
the initial forces we generate to lift the glass are ﬁnely tuned to
its anticipated weight – and to our predictions about the friction
coefﬁcients and compliance of the material from which the glass is
made.
The event of seeing a glass of water and recognizing our
thirst primes a set of affordances that are addressed by a num-
ber of functionalities. By functionality of a sensorimotor event
I understand a particular operation carried out by the system
that deals with the event’s affordances. It is important to note
that the notion of functionality is a theoretical construct. It is
the outcome of a functional analysis of the event (Cummins,
1985), and thus it depends of the way the analysis character-
izes the functional elements and the interaction among them.
Such an analysis can have alternatives which can provide equiv-
alent characterizations of the event. However, a functionality
intends to describe a speciﬁc continuum of neural, bodily, and
environment processes and elements articulated in a determinate
way. All the components in the continuum play an active causal
role, and together they account for the organism–environment
behavior.
Functionalities usually correspond to the sensorimotor abilities
that a system shows, such as, for example, the different skills that
are deployed to perceive depth: motion parallax, motion depth,
or stereopsis. Likewise, as I have indicated in the example above,
grasping a glass of water involves, among other functionalities,
reaching out a hand toward an object, estimating the object’s
size, orientation, and position with respect to the hand, calibrat-
ing the grip according to the size, weight, and material of the
object, etc. A functionality can nevertheless be used to describe
a high-level functional description, such as “depth perception” or
“postural control,” and at the same time it can be broken down
into simpler functionalities that account for the high-level func-
tional description. Hence, depth perception can be analyzed into
motion parallax, depth motion functionalities, and postural con-
trol in anticipatory postural adjustments, anticipatory synergy
adjustments, among other possible functionalities (Klous et al.,
2011).
The particular functionality selected in an event is determined
by the affordance at issue among all the available functionalities in
the system. Note that it is the situation, not simply the elements
present in the situation, what will determine the functionality
in question. A situation where the object is perceived without
intention to act on it will recruit different functionalities than a
situation in which we intend to act on it. For instance, Ganel and
Goodale (2003) found that when people were asked to make per-
ceptual judgments about thewidth of different rectangular-shaped
objects, their judgments were always affected by differences in
the length of those objects. In other words, vision-for-perception
always took into account the overall shape of the objects. But
when the same subjects were asked to pick up the objects, they
responded differently: their grasping movements were unaffected
by the differences in the non-relevant dimension of the objects.
In other words, vision-for-action focused on only the most rele-
vant dimension of the goal object (in this case its width) without
being inﬂuenced by its length. An interesting observation by Ganel
and Goodale (2003) is that when subjects were asked to pan-
tomime the grasping movements without actually touching the
target objects, their grasping was then affected by the differences
in the length of the object, just as it was in the perceptual judg-
ment task. This presumably reﬂects the fact that the production
of a pantomimed movement utilizes perceptual rather than direct
visuomotor processing.
Finally, it is relevant to point out that a functionality does not
assume speciﬁc claims about how to be instantiated, nor does it
require that there be a speciﬁc set of processes, networks, or sys-
tems dedicated to deal with the functionality at issue. In agreement
with the bricoleur and satisﬁcing constraints (Vilarroya, 2012), a
functionality can in fact be the outcome of a speciﬁc sub-system
dedicated to it, or the outcome of a sub-system or set of sub-
systems not focused on such a functionality, but efﬁcient in dealing
with it.
EVENTS ARE EMBODIED AND EMBEDDED
The proposal that I present here conceives events as sensorimo-
tor units that are embodied and embedded, in agreement with the
neural processing principles presented above and elsewhere (Vilar-
roya, 2012). Therefore, the characterization of an event should
take into account the bodily and environmental elements that are
essential in the management of the affordances at issue. If eventn
comprehends a continuum of sensorimotor neural processes, as
well as bodily and environmental elements, eventn + 1 will com-
prehend another continuum of neural, bodily, and environmental
elements that deals with the affordances that eventn raises. This
continuum of processes and elements can be characterized, and
this characterization should be the basis for the identiﬁcation of
an event.
There is now a tradition on which the proposal presented
here is partially based, known as the “extended mind” or “active
externalism” approach (see, for example, Menary, 2010). The
agendas and particular hypotheses of extended mind approaches
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differ among them and also from mine1. In general, the basic idea
behind extended-mind approaches stems from the observation
that, when satisfying some tasks, a part of the world/environment
functions as an element that complements those neural processes
carried out in the brain and which are necessary to fulﬁll a given
cognitive task. The notion of extension or scaffolding includes dif-
ferent kinds of external aids and support. The examples go from
the aid of pen and paper to execute arithmetical operations, up
to the very use of language to derive, for example, arguments.
The rationale is that in many cases the human organism is linked
with an external entity in interaction, creating a “coupled” sys-
tem that can be seen as a cognitive unit in its own right. All
the components in such a system play an active causal role, and
together they govern behavior in the same sort of way that cog-
nition usually does. If we remove the external component, the
system’s behavioral competence declines, just as it would if we
removed part of its brain. The hypothesis is that this sort of cou-
pled process counts equally well as a cognitive process and system,
whether or not it is wholly in the neural system. Hence, among
other things, such processes require that the characterization of
the neural system be extended beyond the limits of the brain
and the body to include elements of the environment. Let me
illustrate how active externalism can be applied to sensorimotor
cognition.
LOCOMOTION
As it has been progressively conﬁrmed in sensorimotor literature,
neural circuits implicated in locomotion interact continuously
with the environment. Locomotion based purely feed-forward
commands is insufﬁcient for animals to deal with changing con-
tingencies in the environment, because of the unpredictable nature
of environmental elements. Indeed, the emerging picture of loco-
motion in natural habitats is a series of temporally varying and
interactively complex events, rather than constant and straight
locomotion program. Flying insects provide a good example of
how this coupling between body mechanics and the external envi-
ronment can generate complex event sequences. Insect wings
must ﬂip over at the end of each wingbeat as the wing reverses
direction. The lift force depends sensitively on the timing of
the ﬂip (Sane and Dickinson, 2002), and the rotation is driven
by passive interactions with the air (Bergou et al., 2007) show-
ing the role of the environmental interactions in deﬁning motor
output.
However, recent theoretical approaches to locomotion do not
only consider that continuous feed-back is necessary, but that loco-
motion cannot be characterized, and modeled, without assuming
a continuum of activities that involve the nervous system, the
1The extended mind approach has indeed raised a heated debate about the charac-
terization of cognitive and mental processes (see for example the issue 28, 2009 of
Topoi). These discussions have focused on the constitutional and causal arguments
of what can be considered mental, and thus, of the ontic status of the external ele-
ments in the characterization of the extended processes. In contrast, the proposal I
defend here concerns the functional analysis of the coupled system brain environ-
ment that accounts for sensorimotor cognition. I assume here the stance that events
are extended, without addressing if such extended processes and elements should be
considered mental or not. Moreover, I defend that all sensorimotor processes must
be considered to be embodied and embedded, at least from a functional point of
view, which is not generally accepted by all active externalism approaches.
biomechanics of the body, and the environment (Chiel et al.,
2009). As Smith (2005, p. 286) puts it, “the ability that makes alter-
nating leg movements is not strictly in the brain, not the body, nor
the world but in the interaction of a particularly structured body
in a particularly structured environment.” Therefore, these new
models assume that bodily and environmental elements also need
to be integrated in locomotion models (Chiel et al., 2009).
GRASPING
Another illustrative domain of the embodied and embedded
nature of events is object grasping. Successful grasping requires
a series of processes that analyze an object’s dimensions and its
surroundings while selecting the appropriate movement path and
hand conﬁguration. Information about intrinsic object features,
such as absolute size, shape, and color of the object, as well as
extrinsic information, such as distance and orientation in the envi-
ronment, need to be processed in order to carry out an efﬁcient
movement. For example, grasping requires using more ﬁngers if
the object is perceived as heavy or slippery, or it prescribes execut-
ing the movement more slowly if the object is fragile (Hoff and
Arbib, 1993; Fikes et al., 1994).
Classic feed-forward models held that grasping motor actions
were deﬁned before onset of the movement and that feedback
loops were engaged toward the end of the movement trajectory, if
at all. However, such goal-directedmovements arenot always accu-
rate and object and environmental properties may change before
the movement is complete; thus, sensorimotor information may
also be needed after movement onset and guide necessary correc-
tions (Hoff and Arbib, 1993). Extant studies (Karok and Newport,
2010) recognize that neural motor commands in grasping are
crude and not precise, and that environmental and biomechan-
ical elements continuously change during movement. Therefore,
now the contention is that continuous feed-back is necessary after
movement onset to apply the necessary corrections. Indeed, feed-
back plays an important role in acquiring and developing motor
skills, and this particularly applies to graspingmovements (Schenk
et al., 2004). Object location, for example, cannot be programmed
before movement onset, and it must be continuously updated,
while it is externallymaintained by the object itself. The fact is that,
until recently, thewidely heldhypothesiswas that the locationof an
object was coded in gaze-centered coordinates, whichwas adjusted
in conjunction with eye movements. Now, the favored hypothesis
is that object grasping depends on current eye position, suggest-
ing that the object properties are continuously processed after each
saccade, and therefore that grasping depends of this gaze-centered
updating stage (Selen and Medendorp, 2011). In sum, the envi-
ronment must not only be the subject of a continuous feed-back,
but it also plays a role in itself in the performance of grasping
actions.
Special environments are also an interesting way to understand
the sensitivity of grasping to environmental contexts. One recent
study focused on sensorimotor deﬁcits in single and dual visuo-
motor tasks during spaceﬂight (Bock et al., 2010). The authors
explored the performance of astronauts in pre-ﬂight and in-ﬂight,
after months at the International Space Station (ISS). The study
showed that even after prolonged exposure to the space environ-
ment, subjects’ visuomotor performance remained compromised
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in both types of tasks, although performance returned to preﬂight
levels within days of returning to earth. The deﬁcits could not be
explained by any cognitive deﬁcit of the individuals, and thus were
attributed to the role of the context. In other words, cognitive per-
formance of individuals seems to be sensitive to all the elements
that comprehend the individual-in-an-environment.
Pathological conditions of object grasping also illustrate the
critical role of the environment. Brain damage caused by stroke
can lead to apraxia, an impairment frequently involving defec-
tive motor actions grasping or tool using. A usual paradigm to
study the ability of apraxic patients involves three different exe-
cution modes: pantomime use of a tool, its demonstration, and
the actual use of a tool. In general, it is reported that patients
with apraxia show more salient deﬁcits in the pantomime of tool
use than during actual use (Randerath et al., 2011). However, this
result cannot be explained in terms of classical deﬁcits of neuro-
logical conditions. According to the “severity hypothesis,” there
is a continuum of task-difﬁculty: actual use is the most difﬁcult
task, because the patient has to move a hand with a tool, and
pantomime is the easiest, because the patient must only move
a hand. Yet, neurological patients showed the inverse effect in
their study: they were better at the actual use of the tool with
the hand. The authors explain this paradox by assuming that in
the actual use of the tool the environment, i.e., the tool, pro-
vides resources, and information that are absent in pantomime.
The tool constrains the possibilities of an action by reducing the
degrees of freedomfor the required action, and therefore itmakes it
easier.
Finally, computational models of object grasping have begun
to integrate the environment in their formalization. In principle,
algorithms for controlling complex bodies in grasping activities
were supposed to represent the bodily and environmental ele-
ments. However, an alternative view is that the mechanics of the
moving parts interaction with the environment may actually sim-
plify control (Nishikawa et al., 2007). These new models include
parameters that are environmentallymaintained: movement plan-
ning is assumed to rely on accessing the extrinsic properties of an
object (e.g., its location, orientation, etc.), as well as the intrinsic
properties of the object (e.g., shape, size), without internally cod-
ing for them. In sum, the environment is beginning to be included
in computational models as an intrinsic part in the computations
of grasping movements.
DEXTEROUS SKILLS
Extant studies on sequence learning of sensorimotor skills show
the critical role of the bodily and environmental elements. Take
the example of Crump and Logan (2010a,b) who have shown
that skilled sequences, such as typewriting, are extremely sen-
sitive to the particular environment involved in the skill. They
investigated the role of physical properties of the keyboard in
typing, speciﬁcally focusing on tactile, haptic, and propriocep-
tive features. In their study, typists carried out single-word and
paragraph typing tasks on a three type of keyboards: a regular key-
board, a laser-projection keyboard, and a deconstructed keyboard,
made by removing successive layers of a regular keyboard. The
response times for the keystrokes, the interval between keystrokes,
and the error rate increased signiﬁcantly in the non-regular
keyboards, even if the three types of keyboards required the same
visuomotor skills from the typists. In other words, the perfor-
mance of the typists can only be characterized taking into account
the actual environment, rather than analyzing the visuomotor task
to accomplish in isolation.
To sum up, recent sensorimotor literature provides abundant
evidence in support for the assumption that sensorimotor events
are embodied and embedded. In this sense, the idea suggested here
is that the characterization of sensorimotor events should always
include those neural processes that deal with the affordances at
issue, but also those bodily and environmental elements that are
essential to account for the individual’s behavior.
EVENTS BELONG TO SEQUENCES AND CO-OCCUR WITH
OTHER EVENTS
Sensorimotor events have temporal boundaries, with beginnings
and endings, even though what constitutes a boundary is not yet
well-established, but it is directly related to the affordance of the
event: what the situation demands, and when it is satisﬁed or
discarded. It is important to note, though, that these boundaries
are to a certain extent conventions of the characterization, in the
sense that there are no discontinuities in processing, and thatmany
times an event overlaps with the following one. For instance, in
dexterous typing, high-speedﬁlmsof typists typewriting show that
ﬁngermovements often occur in parallel, and the ﬁngermovement
for one keystroke often begins before the ﬁnger movement for the
preceding keystroke ends (Flanders and Soechting, 1992).
EVENTS IN SEQUENCES
Sensorimotor cognition is intrinsically dynamic, and it usually
comprehends sequences of events. Events are indeed seldom tem-
porally autonomous; they usually belong to a sequence. The fact
is that the ability to pattern and register sequence of events is fun-
damental to neural systems. Sequences are pervasive in the whole
neural system, from the most basic neurochemical processes, up
to the most high-level cognitive functions. A wide variety of skills
such as comprehending and producing language, type-writing, or
playing musical instruments rest on the ability to process struc-
tured sequences of events (e.g., speech sounds,movements) and to
assemble elementary responses into novel action sequences (e.g.,
key-presses on the keyboard, phonemes when listening speech).
Furthermore, sequential knowledge enables organisms to predict
what will happen next, where it will happen, and how to react to
it, and thus constitutes the basis for the anticipatory control of
sensorimotor cognition.
Sequences can be of four different types: (a) pre-established
and ﬁxed, such as reﬂexes; (b) learned, and strongly routinized,
such as the dexterous car driving, typing, walking, etc.; (c) learned
and open, that is, not ﬁxed, although codiﬁed, such as speech;
(d) primed by experience and loosely predictable, such as explor-
ing the environment. All sensorimotor events in principle belong
to at least one of these four types; it is extremely unusual that an
event does not take part in a sequence.
There is ample evidence on the role of sequences in sensorimo-
tor cognition (Kurby and Zacks, 2008), and a recent study (Pfeiffer
and Foster, 2013) has shown how an event-based approach to
sequences can be traced down to a group of hippocampal cells that
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predict future sensorimotor events. The extant literature on the
role of events in sensorimotor cognition has nevertheless focused
on the discreteness or continuousness of perception and/or motor
behaviors (VanRullen and Koch, 2003; Siegel et al., 2012). In con-
trast, studies on sequences have not addressed the nature of events
as particular elements in themselves; rather, they have generally
considered events as simple steps in a sequence.
Here I would like to emphasize the relevance of focusing on the
events in sequences as singular elements. Events can belong to a
speciﬁc sequence, and as such, they can be registered in memory
as part of the sequence, but they are also registered as elements
with particular properties. Therefore, they contain information
about their belonging to a speciﬁc sequence, but they also have
properties that are not related to being part of a sequence. Hence,
it would be wrong to characterize events strictly as the automatic
steps in the sequence. Sensorimotor events are singular elements
that belong to sequences but have speciﬁc properties of their own.
Take the example of postural control. Postural control involves
managing sensorimotor cues related to whole-body position and
motion in space and to the displacements of the environment rel-
ative to the individual. Such a management is extremely dynamic
and requires an efﬁcient integration of all sensorimotor cues, so
that each event in apostural sequencehas a critical importance. For
instance, orientation information from various sensorymodalities
canbe abruptly unavailable (for instance,when lights gooff) or can
become inaccurate (when support surfaces are instable). Hence,
postural control mechanisms must be adjusted to maintain stance
at each stage. Studies have shown that postural control manages
these changes through dynamic reweighting of sensorimotor cues
in an eventual fashion. Dynamic reweighting manages the modi-
ﬁcations required to maintain postural control, by proportionally
adjusting thedifferent sensorimotor cues in an event by event basis;
unreliable information is down-weighted, then gradually up-
weighted when it becomes valid again in ulterior events (Peterka,
2002). In other situations, such as maintaining balance on a
level ﬁxed surface with eyes closed, postural control uses primar-
ily proprioceptive sensorimotor cues, which signal body motion
relative to the feet, but if the surface begins moving, ulterior
events discount the proprioceptive information and shift toward
increased reliance on detecting body orientation with respect to
the vertical (Peterka and Loughlin, 2004). In sum, sensorimo-
tor sequences rely on events as the building blocks of an efﬁcient
behavior.
CONCURRENT EVENTS
At a given moment, an organism might be managing different
sensorimotor events at the same time. In this sense, sensorimo-
tor events may be concurrent with as many other sensorimotor
events that are necessary to deal with the affordances of a partic-
ular situation. For example, an individual might be dealing with
balance events, and at the same time trying to grasp a ball in
the air. Concurrency of events is uncontroversial. All models of
sensorimotor cognition acknowledge explicitly or implicitly the
concurrency of different sensorimotor processes. However, the
differences between models lay in the autonomy of concurrent
processes. This has been usually addressed in discussions about
the modularity of sensorimotor processes, even if the question
of temporal concurrency has not been a main vector of such
discussions. I have stated my position on modularity elsewhere
(Vilarroya, 2012). As I indicated above, I assume a contingent
level of functional specialization, where nervous systems process
special tasks, because sensors are physically constrained to pro-
cess certain data and because some circuits repeatedly carry out
certain types of speciﬁc tasks, devoting some ﬁxed resources to
them. The fact of the matter is that the degree of autonomy of
sensorimotor events depends on the contingencies of the situ-
ation and/or the task at hand. Concurrent events are open to
modulation and interconnection among them if the situation
or the task requires it. Let me demonstrate this idea with some
examples.
Dexterous skill execution is a domain where variable modular-
ity has been shown. Logan and Crump (2009, 2011) have studied
the interaction between sensorimotor domains in various skills,
such as in typewriting and musical execution. Typewriting seems
to be strongly modular and informationally encapsulated (but
see Jasmin and Casasanto, 2012). On the one hand, typewriting
involves a set of processes that transform words into keystrokes,
as well as control the motor execution of ﬁngers and hands; on
the other, typewriting involves a set of processes that link the
selection of words to type with the motor execution processes.
Logan and Crump (2009, 2011) suggest that these two modules
are informationally encapsulated. Typewriting seems to be exclu-
sively focused on the result of performance. The outcomeof typing
is a string of letters correctly typed. In contrast, musical execution
is an example of a much less modular architecture between sen-
sorimotor domains. Playing music is different in that the musical
performance itself matters more than the exact execution of the
notes. The musical expressive dimension is a product of reﬁne-
ments of the interaction between the motor execution and the
emotional domain. Guitar players use note sliding, timing, and
vibrato to convey emotion. Piano players handle emotion with
timing and the strength of key striking. In sum, even if both
typewriting and musical execution use similar sensorimotor pro-
cesses, theirmodularities are different, as Logan andCrump(2011)
recognize.
Another feature of the concurrency of events is that concur-
rent events can have a varying degree of autonomy, and at the
same time they can affect each other in a variety of ways. For
example, Novembre and Keller (2011) hypothesized that, if a
musical context can induce speciﬁc expectations in the audi-
tory domain (i.e., a speciﬁc tone), then the motor domain of
such sequential learning should generate comparable expectations
(i.e., the speciﬁc movement required to produce the expected
tone(s)). In agreement with previous evidence for the audio-
motor coupling in musicians (Drost et al., 2005), they showed
that for experienced performers violations of syntactic rules in
the musical domain also induce violations of syntactic rules in
the motor domain. In a similar study, Drost et al. (2007) focused
on how auditory-motor couplings are contextualized to their
own instrument category in expert musicians. They used a task
where musicians played chords on their instrument in response
to visual stimuli, while they were presented task-irrelevant audi-
tory distractors (congruent or incongruent) in varying instrument
timbre. In such a task, they showed that pianists exhibited an
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interference effect only with timbres of their own instrument
category. In a previous work (Drost et al., 2005), they required
expert pianists to play chords on a keyboard in response to spe-
ciﬁc visual stimuli, while at the same time, task-irrelevant auditory
stimuli (that could induce alternative incongruent motor actions)
were presented. They found evidence that expert pianists were
sensitive to incongruences and affected the motor response of
the sequence. It therefore appears that concurrency of events is
a common situation that has varying degrees of autonomy and
interaction.
DISCUSSION
The proposal presented here has been to establish the ongo-
ing event, the particular situation in which a system-in-an-
environment is involved, as the point of departure for the
characterization of sensorimotor cognition. The sensorimotor
event has been deﬁned as a neurally controlled event that inte-
grates all neural processes as well as all bodily and environmental
elements that take part in addressing the affordances of the event at
issue. The notion of sensorimotor event has been used to develop
the basic idea that sensorimotor cognition can be better charac-
terized as the response of an embedded and embodied system
to a particular situation. Such a response depends on the set of
constraints that the antecedent event poses to the ongoing event.
The content of the proposal presented here cannot be con-
sidered completely novel. There have been various attempts to
characterize the notion of sensorimotor events (VanRullen and
Koch, 2003; Kurby and Zacks, 2008). Moreover, the approach
presented here can be related to long tradition that assumes an
embedded and embodied view of cognition. In recent years, the
embedded and embodied dimension has been accommodated in
different ways by various approaches, such as that of ecological
psychology (Gibson, 1986), sensorimotor contingencies (O’Regan
and Noe, 2001), event-code theory (Hommel et al., 2001), and the
approaches of Hurley (2001) or Smith (2005). A thorough analysis
of how my proposal could be contextualized in these (and other)
theories cannot be attempted here. Some critical differences can
nevertheless be noted. For example, event-code theory presents a
detailed theory about a common distal (abstract) code for percep-
tion and action, which cannot have a place in my proposal because
I do not support an abstract representation of events. Further-
more, in contrast to my proposal, event-code theory does not give
the environment a particular role to play. In the case of ecologi-
cal psychology, I defend, in contrast to ecological psychology, that
that there is relevant and irreducible internal neural processing
in sensorimotor cognition. Sensorimotor contingencies theory,
in its turn, is focused on understanding consciousness, which
is not my aim here. Likewise, Linda Smith’s focus on learning
cognitive capacities, and Susan Hurley detailed representational
theory of cognitive competences are neither of them my objective
here.
In my opinion, the view that I advance subsumes the ﬁndings
that conceive sensorimotor cognition as a dynamic, embodied,
and embedded sequence of events. Furthermore, the notion of
sensorimotor event as presented here suggests, in my opinion, a
particular consequence that is interesting to explore. In adopting
the embodied and embedded sensorimotor event as the building
block of sensorimotor cognition, I focus sensorimotor cognition
on how an organism-in-an-environment responds to a situation,
rather than on how a neural system responds to an external input.
In other words, the classical framework of external input, inter-
nal processing, and external output can be turned around into a
extended (neural, bodily, and environmental) antecedent, as input,
and an extended consequent, as output.
Classically, the task of the nervous system was described as
a function which maps an n-dimensional input space (from the
sensors) to an m-dimensional output space (the actuators). This
framework suggested that the mapping function uses a set of com-
putations which transforms sensory data into motor data. Take
the identiﬁcation of a car coming toward you. In this situation,
the classical framework states that the sensors receive visual infor-
mation that is processed into the category “car” object, with the
property of moving toward you at high speed. Then, this informa-
tion is processed and transferred into a motor action associated
with something like “jump aside.” However, the proposal pre-
sented here suggests a modiﬁcation in this scheme. Instead of
assuming the classical sensory input mapping into a motor out-
put (Figure 1), it implies an eventn mapping onto eventn + 1
(Figure 2). In this framework, the input would not be a sen-
sory pattern, but an integrated sensorimotor pattern coupled
with the relevant bodily and environmental elements, and the
output would also be an integrated sensorimotor pattern cou-
pled with the relevant bodily and environmental elements. In
the situation of the approaching car, the proposal presented here
suggests that we treat each stage as a response to the previous
one. The eventn provides a set of affordances that will cause
eventn + 1 to begin motor responses of “jumping aside,” even
before the concept of “car” is active, constrained by neurobio-
logical bias and memory of previous similar experienced events.
Indeed, the ﬁrst sensory information received from the car is
processed in an event containing certain sensorimotor particu-
larities that primes a new event with motor actions that could
FIGURE 1 |The classical sensory input mapping into a motor output.
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FIGURE 2 |The framework characterizing eventn mapping onto eventn + 1.
be associated with initiating an avoiding behavior. This new
event processes new sensory information integrated with motor
information and the relevant environment (e.g., standing on
a stable or unstable support) that primes the following event.
The idea is that this scheme is reproduced in all sensorimotor
events.
In my opinion, this framework provides a tool to characterize
the dynamic, embodied and embedded nature of sensorimotor
cognition. For example, in the case of the approaching car, the
sensory information of the car ﬁrst processed in the event could
be undistinguishable from the information coming from speck of
dust crossing the ﬁeld of view of the individual. Thus, the event
responding to both situations could be alike. However, in the sub-
sequent event, the sensorimotor information will produce two
different sensorimotor scenarios. The different dynamics of the
interaction between the sensory and motor processes in the two
situations will create divergent sequences sensorimotor of events
for each situation. For one thing, the sensorimotor information
produced by the relation between the body position and the speck
of dust will be different than the sensorimotor information pro-
duced by the relation between the body position and the car,much
before the concepts of “car”or“speck of dust”would be active, and
even before the sensory data produced by the speck of dust and by
the car could be distinguished in sensory terms alone.
In sum, I argue that the sensorimotor-event framework is better
suited to account for the way sensorimotor information is pro-
cessed in the neural system. In any event, this is an empirical
hypothesis, and thus it is subject to testing and evaluation. In my
opinion, there are a variety of predictions that can be envisaged,
which for brevity of exposition, I will summarize in the following
conditions:
Environmental condition. The sensorimotor event is based
on the idea certain environmental information need not be
represented in the neural processing, because it is ready available
and it plays an irreducible role in the sensorimotor competence of
the individual. This has the consequence that, among other things,
changing critical environmental properties during an event will
change the ongoing sensorimotor functionalities. Indeed, if the
critical environmental properties are manipulated, the efﬁcient
processing of any task that the neural system is carrying out will
be distorted. The study of sensorimotor performance in spatial
contexts (Bock et al., 2010) is an example of how this condition
can be studied (which can be set in virtual-reality contexts).
Embodiment condition. Embodied features are a constitutive
part of sensorimotor events. Hence, the modiﬁcation of such fea-
tures will compromise the properties of the sensorimotor event,
in the same way that in the environmental condition. As an exam-
ple, the study of Randerath et al. (2011), in which patients with
apraxia show more salient deﬁcits in the pantomime of tool use
than during actual use, can be a good illustration of how to test
the proposal presented here. Likewise, a recent study Warburton
et al. (2013) show how to probe the connection between the event
and the embodiment of cognition.
Processing condition. An event is a neurally controlled element,
and thus subject to a number of processing constraints. For exam-
ple, events have boundaries, and such boundaries have processing
properties that can be probed. Among other things, event bound-
aries are associated with changes in processing time, space, and
goals (Kurby and Zacks, 2008) that should be reﬂected in the
embodied and embedded properties of the event.
Developmental condition. Sensorimotor cognition and its inte-
gration within events have a developmental dimension. Hence,
it would be reasonable to think that the development of
sensorimotor-events’ properties such as, for example, event
segmentation,will correlatewith thedevelopment of sensorimotor
competence.
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Pathological condition. In contrast with the developmental
dimension, we have the pathological dimension. Indeed, senso-
rimotor events are subject to loss of its processing capacities, and
thus, one can infer that there will be a correlation between senso-
rimotor deﬁcits and loss of event’s properties (Kurby and Zacks,
2008).
Another set of tests can be set in the interaction of the previ-
ous conditions. In sum, even if other conditions and predictions
could be added, those included illustrate the sort of predictions
and tests that can be used to probe the hypothesis presented here.
It is important to note, though, that such a proposal is incom-
plete; it provides a basis for characterizing the building block
of sensorimotor cognition but, in order to count as an efﬁcient
framework, there are many additional developments that must
be addressed. Among other things, the proposal must be further
developed to account for how different sensorimotor processes
are integrated within a single event, how the elements of an event,
such as its boundaries, are processed, how the processes belonging
to an event are registered in memory, and how such processes are
then recruited and applied in future situations, as well as many
other critical issues. Additionally, it will also be necessary to pro-
vide a formalization of the extended event framework. A critical
challenge in this characterization is that the relevant environment
should be included in the components of an event. As has been
mentioned before, there are already computational models that
use the environment as part of the computational process. How-
ever, the bodily and environmental contributions have not been
generally formalized in models of sensorimotor cognition. All of
these issues, and many more that will be forthcoming, should be
the content of an further work.
CONCLUSION
The notion of sensorimotor event suggests a different approach to
the classical account of a sensory-input mapping onto a motor-
output. Instead of characterizing how a neural system responds
to an external input, the idea defended here is to characterize
how a system-in-an-environment responds to its antecedent situ-
ation. Applying and developing this notion as the building block
of sensorimotor cognition will hopefully account for its dynamic,
embodied, and embedded nature.
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